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Inclusive fitness theory predicts that sex investment ratios in eusocial
Hymenoptera are a function of the relatedness asymmetry (relative related-
ness to females and males) of the individuals controlling sex allocation. In
monogynous ants (with one queen per colony), assuming worker control,
the theory therefore predicts female-biased sex investment ratios, as found
in natural populations. Recently, E.O. Wilson and M.A. Nowak criticized
this explanation and presented an alternative hypothesis. The Wilson–
Nowak sex ratio hypothesis proposes that, in monogynous ants, there is
selection for a 1 : 1 numerical sex ratio to avoid males remaining unmated,
which, given queens exceed males in size, results in a female-biased sex
investment ratio. The hypothesis also asserts that, contrary to inclusive
fitness theory, queens not workers control sex allocation and queen–worker
conflict over sex allocation is absent. Here, I argue that the Wilson–Nowak
sex ratio hypothesis is flawed because it contradicts Fisher’s sex ratio theory,
which shows that selection on sex ratio does not maximize the number of
mated offspring and that the sex ratio proposed by the hypothesis is not an
equilibrium for the queen. In addition, the hypothesis is not supported by
empirical evidence, as it fails to explain ‘split’ (bimodal) sex ratios or data
showing queen and worker control and ongoing queen–worker conflict. By
contrast, these phenomena match predictions of inclusive fitness theory.
Hence, the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis fails both as an alternative
hypothesis for sex investment ratios in eusocial Hymenoptera and as a cri-
tique of inclusive fitness theory.
Introduction
Inclusive fitness theory aims to provide a framework
for understanding the evolution of sociality and social
behaviour across all scales of biological organization
(Queller, 2000; Boomsma, 2009; Bourke, 2011a). First
proposed by Hamilton (1964), the theory, also known
as kin selection theory, has attracted particular contro-
versy over the past decade. Over this time, criticisms
have been directed at its theoretical foundations, its
usefulness and its empirical evidence base (Wilson &
H€olldobler, 2005; Nowak et al., 2010; Wilson, 2012;
Allen et al., 2013; Wilson & Nowak, 2014; Nowak &
Allen, 2015). In turn, each of these criticisms
has been contested (Foster et al., 2006; Abbot et al.,
2011; Bourke, 2011a,b, 2014; Gardner et al., 2011;
Rousset & Lion, 2011; Liao et al., 2015; Marshall,
2015). For example, Liao et al. (2015) showed that the
conclusion that relatedness does not affect the likeli-
hood of the origin of eusociality is not supported by
the alternative model of eusocial evolution of Nowak
et al. (2010).
Sex investment ratios in eusocial Hymenoptera (ants,
bees and wasps with a sterile or partially sterile worker
caste) have provided some of the strongest evidence for
inclusive fitness theory. Recently, as part of their wider
criticism of inclusive fitness theory, Wilson (2012) and
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Wilson & Nowak (2014) disputed the theory’s
explanation of sex investment ratios in eusocial Hyme-
noptera and proposed an alternative hypothesis with
particular application to the ants. Here, I argue that this
hypothesis (henceforth, the ‘Wilson–Nowak sex ratio
hypothesis’) is both theoretically flawed and unsup-
ported by the data. Hence, the criticisms of inclusive
fitness theory in Wilson (2012) and Wilson & Nowak
(2014) centred on sex investment ratios do not
succeed.
Inclusive fitness theory’s explanation of
sex investment ratios in the eusocial
Hymenoptera
Sex ratio refers to the relative allocation of resources to
rearing females and males, with the numerical sex ratio
referring to the relative numbers of females and males
reared and the sex investment ratio to sex allocation in
terms of biomass. (In the following, sex investment
ratio is expressed as the ratio, biomass of females/bio-
mass of males; in the eusocial Hymenoptera, ‘females’
refers to new queens.) The theory underpinning
current understanding of sex investment ratio in all
sexual organisms is Fisher’s (1930) sex ratio theory.
This states that the stable sex investment ratio for the
party controlling sex investment arises when the fitness
returns to that party from raising a female or a male,
per unit cost, are equal (e.g. Benford, 1978). Linking
inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964) and Fisher’s
(1930) sex ratio theory, Trivers & Hare (1976) showed
that, within populations of eusocial Hymenoptera, the
stable sex investment ratio for any party within the col-
ony equals that party’s relatedness asymmetry, that is
its relative relatedness to females and males. Under
conditions of monogyny (one queen per colony), mon-
andry (single queen mating), worker sterility and ran-
dom mating, the queen’s relatedness asymmetry is
1 : 1 (relatedness to daughters, 0.5/relatedness to sons,
0.5) and the workers’ relatedness asymmetry is 3 : 1
(relatedness to sisters, 0.75/relatedness to brothers,
0.25). Hence the predicted population-level sex invest-
ment ratios are 1 : 1 for the queen and 3 : 1 for work-
ers (Trivers & Hare, 1976). This finding shows that
there is potential queen–worker conflict over sex
investment ratio in eusocial Hymenoptera and predicts
that, if workers control sex allocation, the sex invest-
ment ratio should be female biased (Trivers & Hare,
1976).
Boomsma & Grafen (1990, 1991) extended Trivers &
Hare’s (1976) reasoning to explain within-population
sex investment ratio variation. In some populations,
workers’ relatedness asymmetry varies across colonies
(e.g. because of multiple mating (polyandry) in
queens). Boomsma & Grafen (1990, 1991) showed that,
if workers control sex allocation, workers in
colonies with high relatedness asymmetry should
produce relatively more females and workers in
colonies with low relatedness asymmetry should
produce relatively more males. In short, there should
be so-called split (bimodal) sex ratios, with colony-level
sex investment ratios covarying with workers’ related-
ness asymmetry.
Empirical studies have largely confirmed inclusive
fitness theory’s predictions for sex investment ratio at
the level of both the population (Bourke & Franks,
1995; Crozier & Pamilo, 1996; Bourke, 2005; West,
2009) and the colony (Queller & Strassmann, 1998;
Bourke, 2005; Meunier et al., 2008; West, 2009). In
particular, in monogynous ants, population sex invest-
ment ratios are significantly female biased (Crozier &
Pamilo, 1996; Bourke, 2005). Empirical studies there-
fore support the concept of worker control of sex
allocation, which is a reasonable one as workers, not
queens, rear sexual brood to adulthood (Trivers & Hare,
1976). However, inclusive fitness theory does not pre-
clude queen control, provided queens have the power
to exert it. One relevant mechanism could involve
queens controlling the ploidy and hence the sex of eggs
by controlling release of sperm from the spermatheca
(sperm storage organ); another could involve queens
laying worker-biased female eggs (Bourke & Franks,
1995; Helms, 1999; Passera et al., 2001; De Menten
et al., 2005). Indeed, sex investment ratios in ants often
appear to be evolutionary compromises arising from
ongoing queen–worker conflict over sex allocation
(Helms, 1999; Ratnieks et al., 2006; Rosset & Chapuisat,
2006; Helanter€a & Ratnieks, 2009; Aron, 2012). It has
also been recognized that many other factors aside from
relatedness asymmetry and queen–worker conflict
influence variation in sex investment ratio at both
population and colony levels (Bourke, 2005; Meunier
et al., 2008; West, 2009; K€ummerli & Keller, 2011). For
example, in polygynous ants (with multiple queens per
colony), unbiased sex investment ratios are thought to
arise from either reduced workers’ relatedness asymme-
try, or local resource competition between related
queens to head new colonies, or a combination of these
factors (Bourke & Franks, 1995; Crozier & Pamilo,
1996; Bourke, 2005).
The Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis
for sex investment ratio in ants
Wilson (2012, p. 178) presented the Wilson–Nowak sex
ratio hypothesis as follows:
The goal of the whole colony is to put as many future
parents into the next generation as possible. In ant
species generally, males are smaller and lighter than
virgin queens, often strikingly so, because of the
heavy fat reserves the queens must carry in order to
start new colonies. Males cost less to make, and if the
ratio of energy investment were 1 : 1, more males
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than queens would be available for mating. Most
commonly the young reproductives have only one
chance to mate, so that, on average, producing an
excess of males would be a waste for the colony. . . .
As a result, it is in the best interest of both the mother
queen and her worker daughters to bias energy
investment in favor of virgin queens.
Wilson & Nowak (2014) likewise highlighted the fact
that, in monogynous ants, queens show claustral, inde-
pendent colony foundation, rearing their first worker
offspring without foraging externally using energy
derived from stored bodily reserves. They pointed out
that claustrality explains the sexual size dimorphism
seen in monogynous ants, whereby queens typically
greatly exceed males in size. They then argued that
claustrality is ‘the decisive factor in the sex allocation of
resources’, essentially following the reasoning presented
in Wilson (2012). In addition, Wilson & Nowak (2014)
disputed the concept, from inclusive fitness theory, of
worker control over sex allocation, calling it an ‘error’
and stating that ‘the mother queen, not the workers, is
in principal charge of which sex is preferred’ because of
her control of sperm release from the spermatheca.
Polygynous ants lack claustral colony foundation, or at
least do not show it to the same extent. It is for this
reason, Wilson & Nowak (2014) argued, that polygy-
nous ants show relatively unbiased population sex
investment ratios.
To summarize, the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothe-
sis argues that, if the sex investment ratio in monogy-
nous ants were 1 : 1, the numerical sex ratio would be
male biased (given sexual size dimorphism with queens
larger than males), and so some males would never
mate (given both sexes generally mate once) and would
represent ‘waste’. Natural selection therefore selects for
a 1 : 1 numerical sex ratio and hence a female-biased
sex investment ratio. The hypothesis therefore assumes
that selection on the sex ratio acts to maximize the
number of females and males that are mated. More-
over, it asserts that queen and workers share a common
interest in producing the same sex ratio, queens have
principal control of sex allocation, and queen–worker
conflict over sex allocation is absent.
Critique of the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio
hypothesis
The facts that queens in monogynous and polygynous
ant species show, respectively, claustral and nonclaus-
tral colony foundation, and that this difference explains
the relatively larger queens found in monogynous ants,
are well established and not disputed (e.g. Cronin et al.,
2013). The facts that in most ant species both queens
and males mate once or at most a few times, with
multiple mating in both sexes occurring but being rela-
tively rare, are likewise not disputed (Bourke & Franks,
1995; Strassmann, 2001; Boomsma et al., 2005). What
is disputed is the conclusion drawn from these facts by
the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis. The hypothesis
has several flaws:
Contradicts Fisher’s (1930) sex ratio theory
Fisher’s (1930) sex ratio theory, which is supported by
a huge body of later theory and empirical evidence
(Charnov, 1982; Hardy, 2002; West, 2009), shows that
selection on the population sex ratio is frequency
dependent and does not act to maximize the number of
females and males that are mated. In general, selection
on the sex ratio is frequency dependent because the
rarer sex will gain higher mating success, creating selec-
tion for overproduction of the rarer sex and so redress-
ing imbalance in the sex ratio. There is no selection to
maximize the number of females and males that are
mated because selection acts on the average fitness
return from rearing a member of either sex, while
permitting variation about this average. To be more
specific, consider the standard case in which a nonso-
cial female parent rears daughters and sons that mate
randomly. Let c equal the cost ratio (per capita cost of a
female/per capita cost of a male) and let the stable
numerical sex ratio = X : 1 females : males. Then, if
the mating success (average per capita number of
mates) of females is set at 1 unit, that of males equals
X units (there are X females for every male). By Fish-
er’s (1930) sex ratio theory, the stable sex investment
ratio occurs when per capita fitness returns on each sex
per unit cost are equal (henceforth, the ‘Fisherian con-
dition’). Given the mother is equally related to sons
and daughters, this occurs when
female mating success=c ¼ male mating success:
In the present case, this condition is therefore 1/
c = X, from which, if costs are equal (i.e. if c = 1),
X = 1. In short, as is well known, the stable sex ratio in
this case is 1 : 1 and both sexes have equal mating suc-
cess (of 1 unit). There are no terms for the mating fre-
quencies of the sexes in the Fisherian condition. A
numerical example shows why. Say that in the above
case each female mated once and each male could mate
10 times. Take any set of 10 females and assume each
is mated. As all 10 matings could have been gained by
one male, nine of every 10 males could be unmated.
Nonetheless, because 1 in 10 males would mate 10
times, male mating success would equal ((1 9 10) + (9
9 0))/10 = 1 and hence would be unchanged. Thus,
the Fisherian sex ratio is stable even if many males (in
this case 90%) never mate and represent ‘waste’. In
this example, according to the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio
hypothesis, natural selection would produce a numeri-
cal sex ratio of 10 : 1 females : males to avoid such
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‘waste’. However, this sex ratio would not be stable. If
female mating success equalled 1 unit, male mating
success would equal 10 units, and so mothers would be
selected to overproduce males, driving the population
sex ratio back to the 1 : 1 equilibrium.
Correspondingly, if in the starting example the
numerical sex ratio were 1 : 1, this would be stable
only for the case of c = 1, regardless of mating fre-
quency. If the cost ratio were not 1, then the Fisherian
condition would not be satisfied, as the fitness return
from females would be 1/c and that from males would
be 1. For example, with c = 2, mothers would be
selected to overproduce males until the stable numeri-
cal sex ratio of 1 : 2 females : males was reached. Note
that, at this equilibrium, 50% of the males would be
unmated. Therefore, the Wilson–Nowak hypothesis
contradicts Fisher’s (1930) sex ratio theory even for the
case of nonsocial organisms. Overall, from Fisher’s the-
ory, the ratio of mating successes is set by the relative
numbers of females and males in the population-wide
mating pool and not by the mating frequency of either
sex (Trivers, 1985; Bourke & Franks, 1995). It follows
that there is no selection to maximize the proportion of
individuals mated. Consistent with this insight, there
are many examples in nature, including in the eusocial
Hymenoptera, where more males are produced than
can ever achieve a mating. For instance, in the honey-
bee (Apis mellifera), the numerical sex ratio is very
highly male biased and most males die never having
mated (Winston, 1987).
Fisher’s logic can now be applied to the case of
monogynous ants. Because the stable sex ratio for the
queen is the same as for a nonsocial mother, the sex
ratio predicted in monogynous ants by the Wilson–
Nowak sex ratio hypothesis (1 : 1 numerical sex ratio
with c > 1) would not be an equilibrium for the queen.
The Fisherian condition for the queen would be 1/
c = 1, which can only be satisfied when c = 1, contra-
dicting the assumption of c > 1. A 1 : 1 numerical sex
ratio could be an equilibrium for the workers, if c = 3.
Then, the Fisherian condition for workers would be
0.75 9 1/3 = 0.25 9 1, with 0.75 and 0.25 being work-
ers’ relatednesses to females (sisters) and males (broth-
ers), respectively, and so would be satisfied. But, as
Trivers & Hare (1976) showed, the stable sex ratios for
the queen and workers would differ, negating the
assumption of the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis
that both parties favour the same equilibrium. In sum,
the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis is a direct con-
tradiction of the long-standing game-theoretical logic of
Fisher’s (1930) sex ratio theory in both nonsocial and
social taxa.
Fails to explain split sex ratios
Both inclusive fitness theory and the Wilson–Nowak
sex ratio hypothesis predict female-biased population
sex investment ratios in monogynous ants and
unbiased population sex investment ratios in polygy-
nous ants, each of which is observed (Bourke & Franks,
1995; Crozier & Pamilo, 1996; Bourke, 2005). However,
in many eusocial Hymenoptera, including many
monogynous ants, populations exhibit split sex ratios,
with some colonies concentrating on female production
and others on male production (Boomsma & Grafen,
1990). The Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis offers
no explanation for split sex ratios. By contrast, inclusive
fitness theory explains split sex ratios as a function of
either variation in workers’ relatedness asymmetry (via
Boomsma & Grafen’s (1990, 1991) split sex ratio
theory) or ongoing queen–worker conflict over sex
allocation (Helms, 1999; Bourke, 2005; Rosset &
Chapuisat, 2006; Helanter€a & Ratnieks, 2009;
K€ummerli & Keller, 2009).
Evidence that colony-level sex investment ratios cov-
ary with either workers’ relatedness asymmetry or the
distribution of power to influence sex allocation
between queens and workers is considerable (Queller &
Strassmann, 1998; Bourke, 2005; Ratnieks et al., 2006;
Meunier et al., 2008; Helanter€a & Ratnieks, 2009;
K€ummerli & Keller, 2009; West, 2009). These factors
do not explain all cases of split sex ratios (e.g. Wiernasz
& Cole, 2009; Debout et al., 2010), and inclusive fitness
theory recognizes that sex ratios at both population and
colony levels are affected by many factors (Bourke,
2005; Meunier et al., 2008; West, 2009; K€ummerli &
Keller, 2011). However, in cases that are discriminating,
available data support inclusive fitness theory but not
the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis. For example,
the hypothesis cannot explain cases in monogynous
ants in which colony-level sex ratios covary with work-
ers’ relatedness asymmetry and variation in workers’
relatedness asymmetry arises through partial multiple
mating by queens (e.g. Sundstr€om, 1994; Sundstr€om
et al., 1996), as mode of colony founding in these
conditions is constant. Similarly, it cannot explain cases
in facultatively polygynous ants in which colony-level
sex ratios covary with workers’ relatedness asymmetry
independently of queen number (Evans, 1995; Heinze
et al., 2001). Finally, it cannot explain the results of
studies finding that experimentally altering workers’
relatedness asymmetry changes sex investment ratios in
the direction predicted by inclusive fitness theory
(Mueller, 1991; Evans, 1995).
Contradicts empirical evidence for queen–worker
conflict over sex allocation
Contrary to the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis,
the empirical literature supports the occurrence of both
queen and worker control and of ongoing queen–
worker conflict over sex allocation. First, split sex ratios
that covary with workers’ relatedness asymmetry
argue for worker control, because in these cases
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queens’ relatedness asymmetry is invariant and hence
queens do not favour split sex ratios (Boomsma &
Grafen, 1990, 1991). Second, in such populations, evi-
dence suggests that workers achieve a female bias in
colonies with high workers’ relatedness asymmetry by
either selectively destroying queen-derived male brood
or selectively rearing an excess of new queens from
developing queen-derived females (Sundstr€om et al.,
1996; Hammond et al., 2002). Similarly, in an ant in
which queens controlled the primary sex ratio by
varying the proportion of male, haploid eggs laid, work-
ers increased allocation to females by selectively
destroying queen-derived male brood (Rosset &
Chapuisat, 2006). Such manipulations are unex-
plained by the assumption that queens and workers are
in evolutionary agreement.
Wilson & Nowak (2014) dismissed these phenomena
by arguing that workers’ selective destruction of male
brood is costly; that there is no reason to assume it
does not serve the queen’s and the colony’s interests;
and that many factors affect the caste of developing
females. However, models show that workers’ self-in-
terested destruction of male brood can evolve despite
its cost to colony productivity (Chapuisat et al., 1997;
Reuter et al., 2004; Helms et al., 2005). Inclusive
fitness theory provides the reason why such selective
destruction favours workers and not the queen, whose
stable sex ratio is less female biased (Boomsma &
Grafen, 1990, 1991), and the very fact that such a
mechanism reduces colony productivity shows that
colony interests are not met. The existence of other
factors affecting caste does not explain findings
suggesting that workers, via biasing caste determina-
tion, rear an excess of queens in colonies with a high
workers’ relatedness asymmetry (Hammond et al.,
2002). More generally, in some cases in which split
sex ratios occur in the absence of between-colony
variation in workers’ relatedness asymmetry, evidence
suggests that this arises from ongoing queen–worker
conflict over sex allocation as predicted by inclusive
fitness theory (Helms, 1999; Bourke, 2005; Rosset &
Chapuisat, 2006; Helanter€a & Ratnieks, 2009;
K€ummerli & Keller, 2009).
Conclusion
Inclusive fitness theory for sex investment ratios in
eusocial Hymenoptera is built on Fisher’s (1930) sex
ratio theory and offers a comprehensive framework for
understanding sex allocation in all taxa within the
group, including ants. The framework is strongly
predictive, having successfully predicted several major
phenomena a priori, including female-biased sex alloca-
tion in monogynous ants (Trivers & Hare, 1976) and
split sex ratios covarying with workers’ relatedness
asymmetry (Boomsma & Grafen, 1990, 1991). By
contrast, the Wilson–Nowak sex ratio hypothesis
contradicts Fisher’s (1930) sex ratio theory for both
nonsocial and social organisms and is a post hoc
explanation for patterns of sex allocation observed in
ants. In addition, unlike inclusive fitness theory, it is
not supported by the empirical evidence regarding split
sex ratios and queen–worker conflict over sex
allocation. For these reasons, the Wilson–Nowak sex
ratio hypothesis fails both as an alternative hypothesis
for sex allocation in eusocial Hymenoptera and as a
critique of inclusive fitness theory.
Inclusive fitness theory has been used to predict sex
investment ratios across a very broad array of colony
life cycles and mating systems in eusocial Hymenoptera,
incorporating factors such as polyandry, polygyny,
social parasitism, local mate competition and local
resource competition (Trivers & Hare, 1976; Bourke &
Franks, 1995; Crozier & Pamilo, 1996; West, 2009). As
with any wide-ranging theory applied to complex
phenomena, its predictions are not universally success-
ful (e.g. K€ummerli & Keller, 2011). But, overall, the fit
to data is strong (Bourke, 2005; Meunier et al., 2008;
West, 2009). Inclusive fitness theory therefore remains
strongly supported by the evidence of sex investment
ratios in eusocial Hymenoptera.
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